原创 CF40研究部鲁西 中国金融四十人论坛
全球供应链问题尤其是美国供应链危机，让即将到来的圣诞节变得更加昂贵。为了避免货物堵在拥挤的港口，许多美国企业选择成本更高的空运。
除了港口拥堵，美国还面临着司机短缺、集装箱短缺、半导体供应短缺等问题，种种问题叠加在一起，酝酿出一场供应链危机。而在全球化分工的今天，供应链危机正在向欧洲、亚洲等其他国家蔓延。
与供应链问题相伴而来的是美国物价飙升、通胀高企。10月份美国消费者物价指数（CPI）连涨17个月，同比上涨6.2%，创下1990年以来最快同比涨幅。不断攀升的通胀数据，终于让财经高官们直视问题，美联储主席鲍威尔近日表示，“是时候弃用通胀‘暂时性’这个词了”。
高企的通胀压力与供应链问题之间的关系有多大？供应链危机缘何而起？短期内是否有解？如何应对通胀？新型变异毒株奥密克戎来袭，留给美联储的政策空间还有多大？
围绕上述问题，美国耶鲁大学高级研究员斯蒂芬·罗奇（Stephen Roach）分享了他的观点。罗奇曾任摩根士丹利亚洲区前主席，1970年代末在美联储工作时，他曾见证美联储彼时应对恶性通胀的全过程。
2018年，斯蒂芬·罗奇在CF40国际交流晚餐会上发表演讲
对于本轮供应链危机，斯蒂芬·罗奇认为，脆弱的供给与疫情解封后全球商品需求迅速反弹之间的剧烈冲突是引发本轮供应链危机的根本原因。
“疫情封锁解除后经济增长的迅速反弹超出了很多人——包括我自己——的预料，很少有人能想到复苏势头如此迅猛。”他说。
罗奇认为，当前的供应链问题短期内无法解决，改变供应链需要花费大量的时间。未来全球供应链的建设需要更加注重弹性，打出余量。
对于通胀，罗奇说，“供应链瓶颈是通胀迅速攀升的必要不充分条件。我认为，通胀至少明年、甚至在更长一段时间内会远高于美联储2%的目标水平。”
他指出，美联储认识到通胀不是暂时性的，“这是一个重要改变，反映了联储对货币政策的重新审视。”罗奇认为，美国当前的货币政策过度宽松，考虑到当前的通胀水平以及劳动力成本攀升的速度，缩表并不是有效的应对工具。美联储如果继续把名义联邦基金利率维持在零，将引发更深层次的问题，即这种环境下，能多大规模实施进一步财政刺激。
“一言以蔽之，我们的政策空间非常有限。”罗奇说。
本轮供应链危机的根本原因：
总需求爆炸式增长导致供需失衡
1、近期根据媒体报道，美国多个港口货船拥堵，集装箱堆积如山，超市的货架缺货。美国供应链从何时出现了问题？
罗奇：19个月前，我曾在《金融时报》上发表了一篇题为《距离1970式滞胀仅有供应链断裂一步之遥》（A return to 1970s stagflation is only a broken supply chain away）的文章。19个月后的今天，全球供应链已然断裂。
现在回过头来看，全球供应链的断裂，其实是可以预见的。疫情发生之前，供应链已经处于饱和的状态，全球价值链缺乏弹性，所以本就比较容易断裂。只不过，此次供应链危机的根源不在供应链本身，而在于2020年春季疫情封锁解除后总需求的强劲反弹。
因此，供应链出问题其实是迟早的事，相关风险也很早就引起了我的担忧。但总需求这种爆炸式的反弹还是出乎了我的意料。2020年夏天，供应链一下子就跟不上需求了，情况也是从那时开始进一步恶化。
本质上来说，脆弱的供给与疫情解封后全球商品需求迅速反弹之间的剧烈冲突是引发本轮供应链危机的根本原因。
2、哪些因素导致了当前的供需失衡局面？事实上，新冠疫情暴发不久，供应短缺问题便已浮出水面。和上世纪70年代相比，造成美国目前供应链危机的原因是否发生了变化？其中暴露出哪些深层结构性问题？
罗奇：与本轮危机最具可比性的是上世纪70年代的供应链危机。上世纪70年代的供应链危机引发了非常严重的通胀，不仅影响到美国，还冲击了全球经济。
上世纪70年代是我经济研究职业生涯的起点，当时我大学刚毕业，进入美联储工作，亲眼目睹了它对经济情况的严重误判。眼下的危机与当年不同，但有一定的相似性，即价格在短期内迅速攀升。上世纪70年代到80年代初，我们也经历了严重的通胀。但不同之处在于，那时还不存在全球供应链，而现在，供应链已然成为了当前危机中的一个关键因素。因此，我们在进行比较时要充分考虑到这一点，才能准确研判当前经济形势、找到解决之策。
1970年代，在时任主席亚瑟·伯恩斯（Arthur Burns）的领导下，美联储对形势的研判犯了一系列错误，将当时的供应冲击误判为暂时性的、“是一种特殊情况”。
上世纪70年代供应危机的导火索是1973年末的阿拉伯石油禁运令，此举使得全球油价翻了四倍。当时，我所在的部门恰好负责监测这个事件对美国经济的影响。伯恩斯对我们说：“把能源价格从CPI里剔除，能源其实和货币政策没多大关系。”我们照办了。几个月后，发生了粮食冲击，粮食价格飙升，伯恩斯把我们叫到他办公室，对我们说：“我发现粮食价格上涨主要是因为厄尔尼诺现象。受到厄尔尼诺现象的冲击，生活在秘鲁海岸的鳀鱼数量大幅下降，而鳀鱼是美国牛、猪饲料的重要原料。厄尔尼诺现象超出我们的控制范围，我觉得货币政策无需做出应对。把粮食价格也从CPI里拿掉吧。”
当时，我们是拒绝的，我们告诉他不能把粮食和能源从CPI中拿掉。但是伯恩斯说：“你们不拿掉，那我就只能找愿意这么做的人了。”我们又不想失业，所以无奈地照办了，也由此无意中创建了最早的核心CPI指标。伯恩斯很满意。接下来的几个月中，二手车、住房、珠宝、玩具、移动房屋等各类商品的价格纷纷开始上涨，伯恩斯就让我们把越来越多的项目从CPI里拿掉，到了1975年初，我们大概拿掉了60%左右的项目，但剩下的依然在飙升。直到那时，他才承认发生了严重的通胀。
我讲这个故事，是因为现在的美联储面对价格的上涨——最初是木材，后来蔓延到能源、新车、二手车等——第一反应也是表示这是暂时性的，是疫情这一特殊事件所导致的一次性事件。一年前，相关风险初现端倪，美联储说这些现象都是暂时性的，我当时就提出了批评。
现在，鲍威尔终于承认他错了，表示通胀不是暂时性的，货币政策需要做出应对。（编者注：11月30日，美联储主席鲍威尔在美国参议院银行业委员会做证词陈述时，态度转“鹰”，他表示“是时候弃用通胀‘暂时性’这个词了”。）我赞赏他承认错误的勇气。美国财长、美联储原主席耶伦最近也发表了相同的言论。
这是一个重要的改变，反映了联储对货币政策的重新审视。联储此前对通胀的看法——即物价上涨只是疫情导致的暂时性问题，不需要采取货币政策措施——是错误的。恰恰相反，当前的通胀需要尽快采取货币政策进行应对，美联储终于认识到这一点，我对此表示赞赏。
至于这背后的结构性问题，我们还是要从供需失衡来分析。事后来看，不难发现，只有经济增速较低的时候，供给端才能撑得住。以前供应链非常强调效率，往往长期处于紧绷的状态，缺乏弹性。2008年全球金融危机之后，我们的增长反弹相对较为缓慢；如果这次后疫情复苏也相对平缓，供应链就能撑得住，也就不会有严重的通胀问题了。只不过，这次的反弹太强劲了。
疫情封锁解除后经济增长的迅速反弹超出了很多人——包括我自己——的预料，很少有人能想到复苏势头如此迅猛。美联储当然也没预料到，也正因如此才采取了非常激进的大规模货币刺激政策。事后回想，这种方法的问题在于，货币政策刺激、大规模扩表、迅速将利率降到零等政策的效果恰恰被疫情解封放大了。现在回头来看，我们发现了这个问题，但当时是意识不到的。
疫情封锁意味着经济增长几乎会完全停滞，而经济哪怕只是部分开始重启（更不用说完全重启），都会带来大幅增长，而在这个时候叠加大规模的货币政策刺激，就会导致总需求爆炸式增长，从而进一步加剧供给端本就已经存在的压力。
供应链问题短期内难以解决
未来需更加注重弹性、打出余量
3、似乎不光是美国，英国、欧洲等其他国家和地区目前也面临供应链问题。其他地区面临的供应链问题和美国是否类似？在您看来，这轮全球供应链危机的堵点主要发生在哪些环节？
罗奇：欧洲、英国面临与美国类似的挑战并不是巧合，这几个经济体都得益于全球价值链下生产及组装的全球分工。与美国一样，欧洲和英国在解除疫情封锁后，也经历了迅速的经济复苏——当然，英国的复苏势头相对更强劲，但两者都经历了与美国类似的供需错配。
此外，它们总需求的结构与美国很像，解封后，总需求的增长同样主要集中于耐用消费品领域。事实上，解封后的这段时间里，耐用消费品需求增长的速度远远超出了以前。
数月前我曾就此写过一篇文章“Hitting the Limits of Pent-Up Demand”。我从研究生时期就开始研究耐用消费品。我们一般用存货调整模型（stock adjustment models）来分析耐用消费品的趋势。这个模型反映出一个事实，即耐用消费品的使用寿命很长，如果你短期内买很多，那么接下来往往就不会继续购买，因为短期内不再需要。我们不会不停地买新车，车都是开几年再换，家具、电器也是如此。所以，耐用消费品价格的走势超出了我们的预期。
中国消费需求的反弹就不像美国、英国、欧洲等一样那么集中于耐用消费品，这可能也是中国的CPI价格压力低于这几个经济体的原因。
接下来谈一下全球供应链的主要瓶颈。通过供应链在全球的布局，我们将不同地区生产的零部件聚集在一起，最终在中国或其他东亚国家完成组装。全球供应链平稳运行的关键在于高效的交通运输系统。目前，全球供应链面临的一大瓶颈是航运业。当前，集装箱运输能力不足以满足整体需求；美国的港口吞吐能力也跟不上需求，西海岸尤其明显，南部海岸和东部海岸也有类似情况；欧洲面临同样的问题。陆运方面，货车运输是另一个瓶颈，我们没有足够的司机。
因此，只有当交通运输系统运行平稳顺畅时，供应链才能充分发挥作用。但现在我们做不到这一点。
当然，半导体供应短缺也是一个重要的瓶颈，这对包括汽车和电器在内的所有含电子零部件的精密产品的制造都产生了巨大冲击。
4、供应链危机将对全球经济造成怎样的影响？如何应对这些可能的影响？
罗奇：过去20年来，全球供应链经历了长足发展。我很难想象未来几年我们对全球供应链的依赖程度会降低。当前世界，各国紧密联结在一起，所以我们应致力于更好地管理这个一体化的世界。
全球金融危机的前几年间，我们确实犯了严重的政策错误。但当前我们面临的是一场百年不遇的大流行病，新冠疫情引发的冲击不能简单归咎于政策制定者，尤其是经济政策制定者的错误。未来很长一段时间内，疫情会以多种方式与我们共存，虽然我不是流行病学家，但这已经是一个共识。奥密克戎变异毒株的出现，再一次证明了新冠病毒惊人的生命力。
当前，基于全球价值链的全球经济网络存在上述诸多脆弱性，如何应对这些问题是我们面临的重要挑战。为此，战略家、政策制定者与学者需要重新思考价值链在当前紧密联结的全球经济中所扮演的角色、以及如何更好地管理它。
5、您预计供应链危机会持续多久？如何解决全球面临的供应链危机？
罗奇：我们要认清现实：当前的供应链问题不是短期内可以解决的。改变供应链需要花费大量的时间。Tim Cook在担任苹果公司CEO之前曾负责苹果的供应链建设。为构建生产手机电脑的高效供应链，他花了15年的时间。
研究表明，供应链的粘性非常强，不会轻易变化，改变供应链绝非易事。有很多政治家鼓吹生产回迁（reshoring），认为我们完全不需要供应链，把所有生产都从离岸外包迁回国内即可。但这个过程需要很长的时间，不是简简单单说办就办的。
5个月前，拜登政府发布了一份关于应对供应链问题的长篇报告，其中提出了很多具有建设性的建议，包括加强供应能力建设与工人培训、改善运输系统等，但没有任何一条建议是可以快速见效的，所以不要幻想可以通过组建一个工作小组就能想出迅速解决供应链瓶颈的办法。这个问题短期内是无法解决的。
反思过去，我认为我们过于强调供应链的效率了。从2008年全球金融危机以来，我们就进入了慢增长的时期。事实上，在金融危机前几年，增长就已经开始放缓。我们已经习惯了慢增长。我们过去犯的一个错误就是认为在这种慢增长环境下，供应链不需要太多弹性，不用为需求的短期迅速增长留出余地。
因此，未来全球供应链的建设需要更加注重弹性，打出余量。当然，这是有代价的，因为对于消费者和企业来说，供应链下产能利用的越充分，成本就越低，就能以更低的价格购买零部件和商品，而如果为类似于近期出现的这种需求短期迅速增长的情况留出缓冲的余地，就会降低全球供应链长期以来带给我们的“效率红利”。
总而言之，此次供应链冲击带给我们的一个教训是，全球供应链一直以来缺乏弹性，因此也就不够灵活。未来我们需要更加重视这个问题。
通胀压力至少延续到明年
美联储需要通过调整利率应对通胀
6、美国通胀指标在10月份创下新高。供应链问题在多大程度上推高了通胀？您如何看待接下来的通胀走势？
罗奇：供应链瓶颈是通胀迅速攀升的必要不充分条件。我认为，通胀至少明年、甚至在更长一段时间内会远高于美联储2%的目标水平。美联储应更积极地应对通胀压力。
我写了一系列文章批评美联储应对通胀的方式。面对通胀压力全面持续攀升，缩表并不是有效的应对工具。
缩表对于金融资产以外的事项到底有何种影响是一个备受争议的问题。接下来，美联储应将重点放在降低总需求增速上，为此，就需要抬高真实利率水平。结合最新的CPI数据来看，剔除通胀影响后的联邦基金利率低至-6%，我查看了历史数据，发现联邦基金利率上一次跌落谷底是在上世纪70年代，但那时也只跌到了-5%。如果说那个时候美联储酿成大错，那么现在或许正在重蹈覆辙。美联储需要更积极地通过调整政策利率来应对通胀，而不能只靠缩表。
7、美国劳工统计局数据显示，10月份平均时薪同比增长4.9%，失业率降至4.6%。一些人认为，持续的工资上涨是通胀的主要驱动因素之一，菲利普斯曲线已经“觉醒”，过去四个季度的斜率比 COVID-19 爆发前的十年明显陡峭。你同意这个观点吗？
罗奇：我不太确定劳动力成本攀升是否是造成本轮通胀压力的原因。不过，如果工资通胀继续沿着当前的轨迹发展，劳动力成本确实可能会在更大程度上推高通胀。目前，美国的失业率迅速下降，出现了前所未有的大规模离职潮，员工纷纷辞职、跳槽，许多关键行业面临严重的劳动力短缺，而这无疑会增加成本压力，从而进一步加剧疫情引发的价格冲击。
8、工资上涨对通胀的影响是暂时的，还是会对美国通胀预期产生持续影响？您认为值得高度关注吗？美联储会相应调整货币政策吗？
罗奇：美联储非常重视工资与通胀之间的关系，会重点考虑基于生产力调整后的工资水平或者说单位劳动成本。
因为如果工资增长与生产力增长相匹配，那就不是问题。但事实上，过去15年以来，生产力增长一直困扰着美国。疫情催生了一些新的模式，如线上沟通等，这些转变可能会在一定程度上促进生产力增长，但在失业率暴跌、大规模离职潮导致劳动力供给降低、从而引发工资水平飙升的背景下，新模式带来的增长并不足以对冲这些因素产生的负面影响。
所以，美联储确实应该重视劳动力市场和疫情导致的供需失衡两者之间的关系。但不管是价格压力从暂时性、偶发性的问题演变成为长期性、大规模的问题，还是失业率大幅下跌导致工资压力攀升，都指向同一个方向，都要求美联储在收紧货币政策时更有自律。
美国当前的货币政策宽松过度了。考虑到当前的通胀水平以及劳动力成本攀升的速度，美联储不应该继续把名义联邦基金利率维持在零，如果不进行调整，这会是一个很大的政策错误。
9、如果Omicron大规模爆发对经济造成进一步打击，留给美国决策者的政策空间还有多大？
罗奇：如果奥密克戎传染性极强、且我们现有的疫苗对其无效，那么美国经济乃至全球经济都毫无疑问会再次遭受沉重打击。这是最坏的情况。
近期，奥密克戎已经引发市场担忧。目前，医学专家对奥密克戎的了解尚不充分，整体预期是它的威胁不会太大，但如果这一预测出现偏差，奥密克戎对经济造成新一轮大的冲击，我们的政策工具会非常有限。
假如奥密克戎变异毒株导致经济增长大幅放缓，那么通胀压力会得到一定程度的缓解。我不确定奥密克戎会产生多大的威胁，从我所了解的信息来看，它或许不会像新冠刚爆发时引起那么剧烈的经济活动收缩，甚至可能还没有德尔塔变异毒株的影响大。但现在还不能下定论。
当前，美联储的资产负债表已扩张过度，政策利率为零，美国财政赤字达到历史新高——我们当然也可以继续印钞、央行可以继续对金融市场注入流动性，也可以再推出新的开支计划，但利率已经在相当一段长的时间里停留在零的水平。在此背景下，采取这些措施会产生我们无法妥善应对的长期后果。
如果疫情不再对总需求构成大规模的冲击，即使经济增长一定程度上放缓（比如中国就是这样的），总需求还是会处于高位，而引发通胀的是总需求与总供给之间的相对失衡。中国的通胀压力似乎没有美国、欧洲等地这么严重。美国的通胀压力确实非常大，我们的CPI同比增长现在已经高达6%。
通胀攀升时，很难将利率维持在零水平。这也会引发更深层次的问题，即这种环境下，能多大规模实施进一步财政刺激。因此，一言以蔽之，我们的政策空间非常有限。
英文实录
1． According to recent news reports， many ports in the United States have experienced congestion， containers are piled up， and supermarkets are out of stock． When did supply chains in the US start to encounter such problems？
Stephen Roach：19 months ago I wrote an article in the Financial Times titled ‘A 1970s-style stagflation is one broken supply chain away．’ That was 19 months ago， and the supply chain has clearly broken．
The fracture in the global supply chains was， in retrospect， something we could have seen． Heading into the pandemic， supply chains were already stretched to the maximum． There was very little slack built into global value chains． So， it wouldn’t take much to cause a break， and the break came not from the supply chain itself， but from the enormous bounce-back in post-lockdown aggregate demand that occurred in the spring of 2020．
So， it was an accident waiting to happen； it’s one that I had worried about well before the current problems have now arisen． The big surprise to me came from the explosive bounce back in aggregate demand， and the supply chains gave way very quickly in the summer of 2020． The situation has gone from bad to worse since then．
In essence， it was a shaky， fragile supply side that was coming into sharp conflict with an extraordinary bounce back post-lockdown in global demand for goods．
2.What factors do you think have caused the current imbalance between supply and demand？ In fact， shortly after the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic， supply shortages already surfaced． In your opinion， is the cause of the current supply chain crisis different from that of the previous round？ What are the structural problems behind？
Stephen Roach：To me the most relevant previous example is the supply disruptions of the early 1970s． That set the stage for a very， very serious inflation problem in the United States and around the world． I had just come out of the graduate school and started working then as an economist at the US Federal Reserve． The Federal Reserve under the chairmanship of Arthur Burns made a series of major analytical mistakes in dismissing supply shocks as transitory and as one of ‘special developments．’
It started with the quadrupling of world oil prices after the Arab oil embargo of late 1973． At the time， I was working with the research team at the Fed that was charged with monitoring the impacts of these disruptions on the US economy． Chairman Burns said： “Take out the energy component of the CPI， because it does not really relate to monetary policy．” So， we did that． And then a few months later， there was a food shock， with soaring food prices， and Arthur Burns called us into his office and said： “I’ve figured out that this is due to El Niño weather effects that are having an adverse impact on anchovies， a fish of the coast of Peru， that goes into the creation of feedstocks， the food for cattle and pork in the United States． I don’t think monetary policy should respond to El Niño weather effects that are beyond our control． So， take that out of the CPI as well．”
At that point， we objected． We told the Fed Chairman， you can’t take food and energy out． He said， if you don’t do it， I will find somebody who will． So we didn’t want to lose our jobs， and we did that． Unwittingly，we created the first core CPI． We took food and energy out and Burns was pleased． A few months later， he had a problem with used cars， home ownership， women’s jewelry， children’s toys， mobile homes， and he kept asking us to take more and more out of the CPI until finally in early 1975 we have taken maybe 60% out of the CPI， and the remainder was still going up far too sharply． Only at that point， did Burns concede that there was a serious inflation problem．
I tell you the story because the first response of today’s Federal Reserve is to view the current outbreak of sharp price increases - initially in lumber and then in energy and cars （both new and used） – as transitory， temporary — one-off developments， reflecting Covid． I was very critical of that interpretation when a year ago the Fed dismissed these problems when they first became evident．
Chairman Powell has finally conceded that he was wrong． He no longer believes that these are transitory developments that should not be addressed by monetary policy． I commend him for admitting this mistake． Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen， former Chair of the Fed， has said the same thing in front of the U.S． Congress very recently．
This is an important development and represents a major rethinking of monetary policy． The initial response of the central bank to call these now pervasive price increases temporary or transitory due purely to a Covid-related shock is wrong． The inflation we are seeing right now has actionable consequences for monetary policies that need to be addressed sooner rather than later． I commend the Fed for finally coming around to that point of view．
Regarding the structural issues， it is important to go back to the supply-demand imbalance． We now know， with the benefit of a hindsight， that supply was adequate only for a low-growth economy． Supply chains stress efficiencies， they don’t have a lot of slack built into them． What happened was we didn’t get a slow-growth rebound as we did in the aftermath of the global financial crisis． If we had a slow-growth recovery this time as we did in the aftermath of the global financial crisis， the supply side would have held， and we would not have had this inflation problem． But we didn’t get that．
Again， I’ll go back to the extraordinary rapid rebound in the economy in the aftermath of the lockdown． Many， including myself， did not think that the economy would come back as sharply as it did． The Federal Reserve certainly did not， which is why they were very aggressive in providing monetary stimulus． The problem with that approach is that the combination of extraordinary monetary stimulus — sharp expansion of the balance sheet while cutting interest rates immediately to zero again — was reinforced by the end of the lockdown．
A lockdown basically shuts down your economy． You saw that in China with a record decline in GDP in Q1， 2020， but when you go from a complete lockdown to just a partial reopening， that’s a big surge in economic growth． If the central bank is providing aggressive monetary stimulus at a time of surging economic growth refelecting the end of the lockdown， then you get an explosive growth in aggregate demand． That then exacerbates the pre-existing problems on the supply side that I warned of 19 months ago．
3． Freight costs tracked by the Baltic Exchange Dry index have fallen by about one-third in the past month． Moreover， the US government has asked the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach to operate 24/7． Do you think the supply chain crisis will be resolved soon？ Or， how long do you expect the crisis to last？
Stephen Roach：I don’t think it’s going to be resolved soon． If economic growth slows a lot because of this new Omicron variant of Covid， then we will see some moderation of inflationary pressures． I don’t know the full extent of the new variant， but from everything I’ve read， it’s not likely to exact a sharp curtailment in economic activity like the first wave of Covid-19 did or even the echo effects of the Delta variant． But that remains to be seen． It’s hard to know if that’s going to occur．
If there are no Covid-related major disruptions to aggregate demand， then even if economic growth slows somewhat – you’ve already seen a slowing in China – the level of aggregate demand is still very high， and it’s the level of aggregate demand relative to the level of aggregate supply that is out of balance in causing the current outbreak of inflationary pressures． It’s interesting that you haven’t seen nearly as much of that in China as has been the case in the United States and in Europe and elsewhere around the world． But it’s clearly a problem here with our CPI now running slightly above a 6% y-o-y rate．
4． The US inflation hit a 20-year high in October． To what extent have supply chain difficulties pushed up inflation？ How do you see the inflation trend？
Stephen Roach：I’ve already covered that． The fragile supply chain is a necessary but not sufficient condition for this rapid inflation． I think inflation is going to stay well above the Fed’s 2 percent target for easily the next year， and possibly longer． In my opinion， that requires the Fed to be much more aggressive in going after inflationary pressures than it initially signaled would be the case．
I’ve written and followed up with a series of articles arguing that the Fed has the wrong approach to deal with this inflation． It’s addressing what it now admits belatedly as inflation surprise by tapering its balance sheet． I think that’s an ineffective tool to deal with an outbreak of pervasive and enduring inflationary pressures．
It’s very debatable as to what type of impact the balance sheet has on anything other than financial assets． The Fed should be focused on slowing the growth rate of aggregate demand， and it needs increases in real interest rates to do that． Based on the latest CPI， the Federal funds rate adjusted for inflation is -6%． I went back and looked at the lowest the real Federal funds rate was in the early 1970s and it was -5%． If the Fed made a huge mistake back then， it now risks making a comparable mistake today． It needs to be much more aggressive in dealing with inflation through the policy rate， rather than the balance sheet．
5． According to the U.S． Bureau of Labor Statistics， in October， the average hourly earnings rose 4.9% year-on-year， and the unemployment rate fell to 4.6%． Some think that the ongoing wage hike is among the main drivers of inflation， and the Phillips curve has been “awakened” with its slope in the past four quarters significantly steeper than in the decade before COVID-19 broke out． Do you share this view？
Stephen Roach：I hesitate to say that the current inflationary outbreak is driven by a surge in labor cost． If wage inflation continues at this current higher rate， then it’s quite possible that the labor cost’s contribution to inflation will increase． With the sharply falling unemployment rate and unprecedentedly large number of workers dropping out of the labor force， changing jobs， and resigning their positions， there are significant labor shortages in many key industries， and that certainly can lead to more pervasive cost pressures that would exacerbate those Covid-related price shocks that we’ve seen thus far．
6． Is wage inflation transitory， or will it have sustained impact on US inflation expectations？ Do you think it’s worth heightened attention？ Will the Fed adjust its monetary policies in response？
Stephen Roach：The Fed is very mindful of the linkage between wages and inflation， and they would add in – as would I – that the key is to focus on productivity-adjusted compensation， or unit labor costs．
Because if wages are going up at the same pace as productivity， then it’s really not a problem． But productivity has been a problem in the U.S． for the last 15 years． Yes， we have new ways of doing things today — like the zoom interview we are currently conducting — that might be contributing to faster productivity growth． But these developments are not pervasive enough to offset the surging wages that are coming from sharply plunging unemployment rate and the massive resignations that have reduced the supply of labor．
So， the Fed is correct in focusing on the interplay between the labor market and Covid-related supply-demand imbalances that we addressed earlier． But the bottom line is whether it’s the price shocks that have gone from temporary and sporadic to more enduring and pervasive， or whether it’s the wage pressures as an outgrowth of the sharply falling unemployment rate， they are all pointing in the same direction． That reinforces the need for the Fed to be more disciplined in tightening monetary policy．
Our monetary policy is far too easy right now． We should not be running a nominal federal funds rate that is zero when inflation is as high as it is and when labor costs are rising as rapidly as they are． If that continues， that will be a major policy mistake．
7． Other countries and regions such as the UK and Europe are also having supply chain issues． Are their problems the same as those faced by the US？ What are the choke points in global supply chains？
Stephen Roach：It’s not a coincidence that we’ve seen similar impacts in Europe and the UK． They benefit in a similar way from the global dispersion of production and assembly through global value chains． They’ve also experienced fairly rapid post-lockdown recoveries – less so for Europe than the U.K． but they have a similar post-lockdown mismatch between supply and demand that has been evident in the U.S．
Moreover， their composition of aggregate demand is very similar to that of the U.S． where the post-lockdown bounce-back in aggregate demand has been concentrated in consumer durable goods， which have literally gone up far more rapidly in this post-lockdown period than has ever been the case in the past．
I wrote an article about this several months ago （“Hitting the Limits of Pent-Up Demand” in February 2021）． I’ve studied consumer durables ever since I was in graduate school． The models we have long used to understand the behavior of consumer durables are called stock-adjustment models． They reflect the fact that durable goods last for a long period of time， and when you buy a lot of them in a short period of time， then you usually don’t buy many more over the succeeding period because you just don’t need to do that． You don’t need to keep buying a new car， for example． You drive your car for several years until it wears out and then you buy a new one． The same with appliances or furniture in your house， etc． So， we’ve been surprised by the ongoing surge of long-lasting durable goods．
To a large extent， the rebound in demand in China has been less focused on durable consumer goods than is the case in the US， the UK and Europe． Maybe that’s why your CPI price pressures are less of a problem than ours．
On the choke points in global supply chains． Imagine a global supply chain which draws together components from all over the world and assembles them in factories in China and East Asia． The key ingredient you need and the key process for it to run smoothly is a very efficient transportation system． The big choke point globally has been on the shipping end where we don’t have enough capacity in our container shipping industry to satisfy the aggregate demand． In particular， we don’t have enough slack in the port facilities in the U.S． especially in the west coast but also south and to some extent the east coast． The same is true of Europe and the UK． For the land-based transportation， the trucking industry is also another choke point． We don’t have enough drivers．
So， the supply chains work best when the transportation system functions smoothly and seamlessly． And they are not doing that now．
And， of course， there is also a major choke point in semiconductors， with a lack of supply． That’s had a major impact on virtually all sophisticated goods with electronic components， from motor vehicles to appliances．
8． In your opinion， how can the above-mentioned difficulties be addressed / how to solve the supply chain crisis facing the world？
Stephen Roach：The reality of the supply chain dilemma is that there is no easy quick fix． It takes a lot of time to alter supply chains． I have studied supply chains very carefully． In his former capacity at Apple before he became CEO， Tim Cook was in charge of Apple’s supply chain． It took him 15 years to create this very efficient extraordinary supply chain that produces iPhones and computers．
Research shows that supply chains are very sticky， which means they don’t change easily． It’s very hard to alter them． There have been a lot political commentary saying we don’t need supply chain， just bring everything back home． This is the argument for moving from offshoring to what has been called reshoring， bringing back the offshore production． It’s not that easy to do． It’s going to take a lot of time．
The Biden administration， 5 months ago， released a large report on addressing American supply chain problems． They offered a lot of constructive actions， building more capacity， training workers， improving our transportation system， but none of these recommendations can be implemented quickly． So， the idea that we can assemble a taskforce and come up with a quick recipe to address the supply chain is probably a mistake． We’re going to be living this for quite some time．
As I look back on this period， I think we went much too far with the efficiency benefits of supply chains． We’ve been in a slow-growth period since the GFC． Growth was relatively slow in the years before that， too． So， we’ve gotten used to slow growth． When you have a slow-growth environment， you can run your supply chains in a very tight way． You don’t have to allow for major surges in demand． That was a mistake we made．
In the future， we need to build more slack in the global supply chain． This will be costly， because the benefits to consumers and businesses are that very tightly-run supply chains cut costs and allow you to purchase components and goods at a cheaper price． So if you build in a contingency buffer to guard against the types of demand surges that we’ve seen recently， that will cut into the efficiency dividend that we’ve gotten accustomed to from global supply chains．
The lesson here is we do not have enough slack built into our global supply chains， and we don’t have enough flexibility as a result． We need to think about that key consideration more carefully in the years ahead．
9． How will the supply chain crisis affect the global economy？ And how to deal with the potential effects？
Stephen Roach：The world has clearly come a long way in embracing global value chains in the last 20 years． It’s very difficult for me to think that we are going to move away from global value/supply chains in the years ahead． The world is very tightly integrated， so we’ve got to come up with a better way to run this integrated world．
We made big mistakes in the years before the global financial crisis， but you can hardly blame policymakers at least the economic policymakers for a once-in-a-hundred-years pandemic． That’s a pretty extraordinary shock which will be with us in one form or another for probably some time to come． I’m not an epidemiologist， but that’s the standard view． The latest Omicron variant is just another indication of the staying power of the virus．
The global economy faces some major challenges in addressing these types of problems that underscore fragility to its network of interdependencies as underpinned by global value chains． This will send a lot of strategists， policymakers and researchers back to the drawing board to rethink the role of value chains in an interdependent world and how to manage them better going forward．
10． In case of a massive outbreak of Omicron dealing further blows to the economy， how much room is there left for U.S． policymakers to respond？
Stephen Roach：On the worst-case basis， if Omicron becomes a very serious variant that is highly transmissible and is not responsive to the extraordinary vaccines we have， that’ll be a major blow to the U.S． and the global economy． There’s no question about that．
The market over the last several days has been somewhat worried about that． The experts right now don’t know a lot about it， and they are hopeful that it’s not going be that disastrous． But in the event that they are wrong， we certainly don’t have much policy ammunition to deal with another major shock．
The balance sheet of the Federal Reserve has expanded too excessively， the policy interest rates are at zero， our fiscal deficits are at record settings． We could continue to print money and the central bank can continue to inject liquidity in the financial markets， and we could embark on another spending program． But there are long-term consequences of doing that that we have yet to address， mainly because interest rates have been held at zero for so long．
In a period where inflation is moving up， I think that’s a very challenging period to maintain interest rates at the zero bound． That raises even deeper questions about the potential extent of further fiscal stimulus in this environment．
So， the short answer is we don’t have too much ammunition left．
Additional comment：
I’m struck by the comparisons with the early 1970s， because that’s when I started working at the Fed as a professional economist and watched the way the Fed made serious mistakes in diagnosing the problem． The current situation is different． There are a lot of similarities in terms of the sudden outbreak of price pressures． But one thing important to know is that while we had horrible inflation problem in the ‘70s and early ‘80s， that inflation outbreak came before we had supply chains． Supply chains were not a factor back then， and they are now． That adds a different wrinkle to the comparison that’s important to think about in diagnosing the source of the problem and the potential cure for it． But this is not the 1970s， but there are some similarities that we need to mindful of． And there are some differences like I just eluded to that we need to carefully think about as well．
